bots.st/robyn-gasless-cross-chain-for-ai-agents
Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents
Gasless cross-chain relaying for AI agents
2573 ms
answered our call
- State
- Answered
- Protocol
- MCP 2025-06-18
- Tools listed
- 87
- Answered
- 3 of the last 3 calls
How to reach it
- MCP, HTTP
https://api.anygas.xyz/mcp - npm
npx -y anygas-mcpReleased 27 Sep 2026, version 1.6.0
What it can do
| Tool | What it says it does |
|---|---|
null_agent_guide | One read that teaches an agent to use every NULL capability with the right privacy posture: create an identity, seal + send + scan, start forward-secret sessions, drop an anonymous tip, check a Legacy heartbeat, make/detect stealth payments, and what each action reveals to whom. All crypto is… |
null_balance | Reads an address balance through the NULL server-side RPC proxy, so YOUR IP never reaches any public RPC provider (this host queries upstream from its own address). BE HONEST ABOUT THE TRADE: querying a stealth address you derived LINKS that address, your session, and the time of interest AT THIS… |
null_calls_info | What the blind call relay offers (1:1 and conference, codecs, join-token model). Media keys are sealed through the feed and never reach the relay. Calls themselves need a media-capable client (browser); agents can read the posture and hand a human the join flow. |
null_capsule_cancel | Destroys a future-dated capsule you sent with {holdMs, cancellable:true}, using its one-time cancel token. Already-released rows are untouchable. The token proves nothing about who you are. Private-lane-only: use the stdio door. |
null_ecosystem | The live NULL manifest: every product (messenger, Pay, Vault, Drop, Legacy, Agent Wire, forward secrecy), its status, its page, the wired/proposed integrations between them, the security spine, and the concept pipeline. This is the same single source of truth the owner console and the human Suite… |
null_login_verify | Stateless dual-signature check (secp256k1 + ML-DSA-65) of a NULLAUTH1 assertion for YOUR rp domain and the ONE-TIME challenge YOU issued; returns {ok, psid, mode, named, meta, handle(claim)}. Prefer verifying locally with @null/login-rp (no call at all); this tool is the convenience path. rp +… |
null_market_delist | Relays a fresh (<10 min) self-issued card whose claim is {purpose:"delist"} - a public listing card can never be replayed to delist someone. A market moderator adds modCred (a role credential {kind:role, ctx:market, role:moderate} from the operator root) and claim.target to remove another listing. |
null_market_list | Relays a NULLCRED1 card the agent issued ABOUT ITSELF (subject = issuer = its own meta; SDK credentialIssue, or the stdio door null_market_list_me which mints it for you). One listing per identity, 30 days, re-post to refresh. Past half-full a NEW listing needs one Plus pass (pass). Note: this… |
null_market_listings | Every current listing {card, at}; identical for every reader. The registry checked only the classical half of each card when it was listed, so it is never a trust oracle: verify the FULL dual signature of any card you rely on (SDK credentialVerify, or the stdio door null_market_browse which… |
null_names_market | Live listings of premium handles for sale, plus the full deal protocol: agree peer-to-peer in a sealed chat, pay stealth or via NULL Escrow 2-of-3, then finalize with the dual-signed (secp + ML-DSA) witness-chained transfer and a 2% ($1 min) fee receipt. Listing your own handle: sign… |
null_names_quote | Quotes a handle: 3ch $512/yr, 4ch $128/yr, 5-6ch $4/yr (deliberately under ENS), 7+ characters FREE forever. Includes live state (available/registered/grace/premium with the 21-day Dutch decay) and the exact register->pay->claim steps. Names are public by definition - quoting one reveals nothing. |
null_notarize | Proof-of-existence: hash the document LOCALLY (sha256, 64 hex) and send only the hash. The issuer countersigns {h, ts} with ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum); ts is SERVER-assigned. Optional owner endorsement: ownerAddr + ownerSig = EIP-191 over "null-notary/owner/v1|<h>"; if you add ownerMeta and that… |
null_prekeys_fetch | Fetches {spk, sigSpk, otk, otksLeft} for a recipient so you can start an X3DH-PQ forward-secret session (SDK: fs.startOutbound). ALWAYS fetch by META-ADDRESS: the sigSpk check verifies against the meta-address spendPub (sha256("null-fs-spk/v1:"+spk), secp256k1) and CANNOT run on a handle fetch… |
null_prekeys_publish | Makes you reachable with forward secrecy: publishes your signed prekey bundle (medium-term spk + one-time otks) so peers can start X3DH-PQ sessions TO you. Generate and sign locally with the SDK (fs.genBundle + publishPrekeys — sigSpk is secp256k1 over sha256("null-fs-spk/v1:"+spk) by your spend… |
null_prov_issuer | Returns the post-quantum issuer public key that countersigns notary attestations, provenance mints and the witness-log head. Pin it once and verify everything against the pinned copy - a proof should never carry the key it wants to be checked against. Public on every lane. |
null_prov_mint | Relays a provenance request you signed LOCALLY (SDK mintProvenance builds it): {meta, claim, ts, sig, bind, sig2}. A post-quantum identity MUST include sig2 (ML-DSA) or the issuer refuses. The issuer checks your signature + identity binding and countersigns - the claim is REGISTERED, not endorsed… |
null_transparency | The signed sha256 of every crypto artifact the server hands out (SDK, bundle, workers); hash changes are witness-chained under release:<file>. Fetch an artifact, hash it, compare - a mismatch means you were served something that is not the signed release. |
null_void_descriptor | Returns a pseudonymous channel descriptor {descriptor, witness:{ts}}; the 3.3 KB ML-DSA signature and the handle-ownership proof come as separate parts (part=sig | part=proof) because they cannot share one 8 KiB lane reply. Verify all three locally (SDK voidVerifyDescriptor) before following… |
null_void_directory | Channels whose creators SIGNED themselves discoverable (dark by default). No search parameters by design: pull pages and filter by tag LOCALLY, so your interests never reach the server. Opaque cursor, neutral order, no counts. Returns 404 if the directory is not switched on in this deployment, and… |
null_void_publish | Relays {descriptor, proof:{ts, sig}} built and signed LOCALLY (SDK voidCreate + voidSignDescriptor + the handle-ownership proof). The registry accepts only the handle owner and stores nothing but the public descriptor and its witness entry - no followers, no counts, no IPs. Private-lane-only: use… |
null_witness_head | ML-DSA-signed head {seq, root, sig} of the append-only log that binds every mailbox record (slot|meta|kemPub|ts). Signed by the SAME issuer key as null_prov_issuer. Keep the last head you saw; a later head must extend it (null_witness_range) - a fork is proof of equivocation. Public on every lane… |
null_witness_range | Up to 20 entries {s, b, r, t} from seq `from`: b binds slot|meta|kemPub|ts, r = sha256(prevRoot + b). Replay the chain from a head you trust to prove a mailbox binding was never silently swapped. Public on every lane. |
robyn_7702_check | Check that a signed EIP-7702 authorization tuple recovers the expected account, and whether its nonce matches the live account nonce. Free, read-only, moves nothing. |
robyn_7702_delegate | The canonical Robyn EIP-7702 batch-executor delegate: its address on each of the 22 EVM chains, the ABI, and the EIP-712 scheme for executeSigned. Delegate to this and the relayer can sponsor your transactions. Read-only. |
robyn_attestation | Returns a relayer-SIGNED attestation that, as of a signed timestamp, every component was up (router, signing daemons, MCP, privacy relay) AND the privacy invariants held — the adversary probes could not distinguish cover traffic from real (classifier = chance) and the k-anonymity floor is… |
robyn_capability_snapshot | A signed, timestamped record of current capability: which chains can actually be PAID OUT ON right now, which are merely policy-eligible, which rails are execute-ready, and whether delivery figures are measured or estimated. USE `serviceableNow`, NOT `policyEligible`, when deciding where to send… |
robyn_changelog | Machine-readable API history. Pass the version your integration was built against as `since` and you get only what has changed after it, with an explicit `breaking` flag on each entry. CHECK `mustAct` FIRST: if true there are breaking changes and an existing integration may ALREADY be failing —… |
robyn_counterparty_check | Your OWN payment history with a recipient address: how many times, how recently, and whether this amount is typical. Call it before paying an address you have not confirmed. THIS IS NOT A REPUTATION SCORE and says nothing about whether the address is honest. A familiar address is NOT a safe… |
robyn_cross_chain | Plan a gasless cross-chain move and get the exact payload to sign. This hosted server never holds your key: call this, sign what it returns with your own wallet, then call robyn_submit to have the relayer broadcast it and pay the gas. |
robyn_delivery_stats | How long settlements ACTUALLY take, per rail and per corridor — not a single advertised constant. CHECK `basis`/`status`: below the sample threshold this returns `insufficient-data` and the figure is a static ESTIMATE, not a measurement. Say which you are quoting when you tell a user how long… |
robyn_errors | The full error taxonomy: every errorCode, whether it is retryable, and the suggested recovery action. Read this once and branch on errorCode instead of parsing messages. |
robyn_evidence_bundle | Assembles EVERYTHING about a settled transfer in one call: the on-chain verification, the unit-by-unit fee breakdown, what the alternative route would have cost, and whether the delivery time is measured or estimated — signed as a whole. This is the artefact to hand to a principal who was not… |
robyn_fee_forensics | Reconstruct a settled transfer unit by unit: destination payout gas, Robyn margin, or a Robyn SUBSIDY where Robyn absorbed a loss. Each line names who was paid and how the figure was derived. Anything that cannot be attributed is returned as `unattributed` rather than folded into another line — if… |
robyn_improve_cost | Turns a price into a decision. Returns concrete, QUANTIFIED changes — a cheaper destination chain with the exact saving, the size at which a fixed payout cost stops dominating, whether the instant float lane applies, and whether rails that would have competed were unavailable. CRITICAL… |
robyn_integration_lint | Post the request you INTEND to make and get back what is missing or unsafe, with the concrete consequence. Run this before your first live execute. Findings marked `unsafe` can lose money or make you report something untrue — fix them, do not proceed. IMPORTANT: it lints the REQUEST only. A clean… |
robyn_mandate_certificate | A signed certificate listing every spend counted against a mandate, the budget, the total spent, and whether it stayed inside. Hand it to the principal at the end of a period. Every spend listed was VERIFIED ON-CHAIN before counting, and the amount is what the chain showed arrived — not what the… |
robyn_mandate_check | Check a proposed spend against a signed spending mandate BEFORE making it. Returns WITHIN_MANDATE, EXCEEDS_MANDATE or EXPIRED plus the remaining budget. If EXCEEDS_MANDATE, do NOT split the spend into smaller pieces to get under the limit — that defeats the control your principal set. Ask them to… |
robyn_mandate_cosign_request | For mandates with a co-sign threshold, check whether a specific spend needs the principal to approve it and get the exact digest they must sign. The digest binds the mandate, the transfer AND the amount, so an approval cannot be reused for a different payment — do not attempt to reuse one. If a… |
robyn_mandate_events | Poll for spend, nearly-exhausted, exhausted, approval-required and revoked events on a principal's mandates. Pass the returned `cursor` back as `since` for only what is new. Use this to tell a principal their budget is running low or that a large payment is waiting on their approval, instead of… |
robyn_mandate_list | List all mandates granted by a principal address, with remaining budget, co-sign threshold, expiry and revocation state. Use this before telling a user they are safe: live mandates can still be drawn against WITHOUT further approval, and a forgotten grant is the one that hurts. Anything they no… |
robyn_mandate_status | Remaining and consumed budget for a signed mandate. Consumption counts ONLY transfers verified on-chain, so the figure cannot be inflated by claiming spends that did not happen. |
robyn_mesh | List the Robyn gasless chains and the cross-chain route graph (22 EVM nodes + Stellar), plus the relayer/Permit2 addresses. No credentials needed. |
robyn_message_anchor_proof | Merkle inclusion proof for an anchored row id: leaf, path, root, the signer’s EIP-191 signature over the batch statement and the on-chain tx when enabled. Verify locally with plus-sdk verifyAnchorProof(). Read-only. |
robyn_message_directory | Every published v2 mailbox. PUBLIC rows carry {address, metaAddress, kemPub}; PRIVATE rows (the default since 2026-08-28) carry {handle, metaAddress, kemPub} and deliberately NO address. Identical for every reader, so fetching it reveals nothing about whom you intend to message — pick the… |
robyn_message_erasure | The last purge statement (expired count, cumulative, root of purged ids) signed by the operator. Read-only. |
robyn_message_feed | Returns released rows {id, ephemeralPubKey, viewTag, ct, releaseAt, nextAfter}, identical for every reader. Scan locally with the SDK (inbox(identity)) — checkStealthAddress with your viewPriv, then open ct with your KEM secret. Page with after=<nextAfter> (exact compound cursor — never skips… |
robyn_message_info | Sonar — PRIVATE · SEALED · POST-QUANTUM MESSENGER (broadcast to everyone, understood by one, remembered by none). Hybrid ML-KEM-768+X25519 encryption, a one-time stealth handle per message, fixed-size ciphertexts, 60 s release grid. The server stores only (ephemeralPubKey, viewTag, ct) — no… |
robyn_message_mailbox_of | For a Robyn name or NULL handle the server must resolve it, so this reveals your intended recipient to the server — prefer robyn_message_directory when you have an address. Returns {address|handle, metaAddress, kemPub} (private-handle rows carry no address by design). Read-only. |
robyn_message_publish_mailbox | Registers a mailbox so others can seal to you. PRIVATE BY DEFAULT: the server stores only a salted hash of your signing address — pass `handle` to be reachable by name (agents get the same handle claim browsers have), or `public:true` to bind your bare 0x address in the open directory instead… |
robyn_message_send | Relays a message you sealed locally with /svc/msg2-sdk.mjs (seal(mailbox, inner) → {ephemeralPubKey, viewTag, ct}). This tool cannot encrypt for you: sending plaintext here would expose it to the relay, so it only accepts the sealed triple. Replay-idempotent (a resend returns duplicate:true). The… |
robyn_netting_account | Whether an address is enrolled (and therefore custodied), its internal balance, recent history, and `nextNonce` — which you MUST use when signing the next transfer or withdrawal. An address that never enrolled is reported as not custodied. Read-only. |
robyn_netting_enroll_payload | Returns the EXACT message the account must sign with its OWN key to open a custodial balance. This endpoint holds no key and enrols nobody — it returns the text; the user signs it, then POST {address, signature} to /api/netting/enroll. CUSTODIAL — this is the ONE part of Robyn that holds your… |
robyn_netting_info | Explains the opt-in netting ledger: transfers between two ENROLLED accounts settle as a book entry — no chain, no gas, no fee, instant, at ANY size including amounts below every per-chain cost floor. CUSTODIAL — this is the ONE part of Robyn that holds your balance; every other tool here moves… |
robyn_netting_preview | Free and read-only. Given an amount, ranks EVERY exit chain by what actually arrives after the destination payout cost is deducted. Those costs differ by more than 1000x (Avalanche delivers ~$0.99994 of a dollar; Linea ~$0.927), so which chain you leave on is a real decision. Pass toChain to price… |
robyn_netting_reserves | Publishes what Robyn OWES across all netting accounts against the real relayer float backing it, per chain. Solvency is checkable rather than asserted. Deposits are refused if they would push liabilities above a safe share of the float. Read-only — a user considering a custodial balance should be… |
robyn_netting_statement | Internal transfers produce NO transaction hash because no transaction occurs — this append-only journal is their only record. Never truncated; page with `before` (a seq number). Use this when a user asks to verify or dispute an internal payment, since there is no chain to check. |
robyn_netting_transfer_payload | Returns the exact string to sign, with the correct next nonce, for a free instant transfer between two ENROLLED accounts. Signs nothing and moves nothing — the sender signs the returned message, then POSTs {from,to,amount,nonce,signature} to /api/netting/transfer. BOTH parties must already be… |
robyn_payment_request_prepare | Build a canonical payment request (payee, chain, token, amount, memo, expiry) and return the digest for THE PAYEE to sign with their own wallet. Robyn does not sign these and holds no payee keys — a request signed by Robyn would prove nothing about the payee. Use this when an agent needs to ASK… |
robyn_payment_request_settlement | After paying, prove it: re-checks the transfer against the DESTINATION CHAIN and confirms the payee was paid at least the amount requested. Returns paid=true only on a verified on-chain result; paid=null means undetermined, which is NOT evidence you satisfied the request. |
robyn_payment_request_verify | ALWAYS run this before paying a request you received. It confirms the payee address, chain, token and amount were signed by whoever controls the payee address, and that the request has not expired. If `signedByPayee` is false, DO NOT PAY — that is what an altered payee address looks like, and… |
And 27 more tools.
In its maker's words
Gasless cross-chain for AI agents: 25 nodes incl. Solana & native Bitcoin. One signature, no gas.
- Website
- api.anygas.xyz
- Source
- github.com/ox31461/Gasless-Anygas-ROBYN-Relay
- Publisher
- ox31461
- Listed from
- the official MCP Registry as
io.github.ox31461/robyn - Version
- 1.0.5, updated 14 Jul 2026
- Kinds of work
- Crypto and web3, AI models and agent tools, Security and trust
The domain it lives on
- anygas.xyz
- registered 13 Jul 2026 (4 months ago), at Cloudflare, Inc., its home page is a working site
From our own crawl of domain names: registry records and the home page as our crawler last saw it.
Every call we made
| When | What happened | Time |
|---|---|---|
| Answered | 2573 ms | |
| Answered | 2488 ms | |
| Answered | 934 ms |
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